1
REPORT OF ACCIDENT TO VT-EQL CHETAK HELICOPTER OF BSF AT FATEHPUR VILLAGE,
NEAR MOUNT ABU, RAJASTHAN ON 13.05.2011
(a) Helicopter
Type and Model : Chetak Helicopter
Nationality : Indian
Registration : VT-EQL
(b) Owner/Operator : Border Security Force,
New Delhi
(c) Date of Accident : 13.05.2011
(d) Time of Accident : 0945 UTC
(e) Last Point of Departure : BSF base, Gandhinagar, Ahmedabad
(f) Point of intended Landing : Mandore, Jodhpur, Rajasthan
(g) Geographical Location of : Lat. 24˚32’33” N
Accident Long. 72˚38’35” E
(h) Type of Operation : Non-scheduled
(i) Phase of Operation : Cruising
(All Timings in the Report are in UTC)
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SYNOPSIS
Border Security Force (BSF) Chetak Helicopter VT-EQL met with an accident
while operating flight from Gandhinagar to Mandore on 13.05.2011 at Fatehpur
village, near mount Abu, Rajasthan.
The accident was investigated by Committee of Inquiry appointed under Rule
74 of Aircraft Rules, 1937; vide Govt of India, Ministry of Civil Aviation,
Extraordinary Gazette Notification No. AV, 15013/003/2011-DG dated 26
th
July
2011.
The helicopter took off from Gandhinagar, Gujarat at time 0850UTC for
operating flight to Mandore, Rajasthan with a Pilot in Command (PIC), a co-pilot,
one Engineer and a BSF Official on board. The flight was uneventful from
Gandhinagar till the time (0940 UTC) it was in contact with Ahmedabad ATC.
While it was flying through Aravali hills range near Mt. Abu, it developed serious
defect in the Main Rotor System. Helicopter was on radial R- 007 at Fatehpura
Village in Rajasthan.
Before impacting the ground the helicopter made a right turn and impacted the
ground with high impact force. The crash site is approximately 40 metres away
from the route as per the flight plan filed by the helicopter. Helicopter impacted
the ground squarely i.e. vertically with no forward movement. It crashed and
caught fire. All the occupants were charred to death inside the burning helicopter.
The accident was caused by the loss of rotor pitch control resulting from
probable failure of Hydraulic Drag Dampers in flight which imposed excessive
tensile load on the Blade Spacing System. One of the Attachment Bolts sheared off
and released one Spacing Cable. The second bolt gave way and the associated Link
opened up, thereby releasing the second Spacing Cable end from the same post.
The severed Spacing Cable Eye-end impacted and broke the pitch control rods
leading to the loss of control of the helicopter.
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1.1 History of Flight
Border Security Force (BSF) Chetak Helicopter VT-EQL met with an
accident at Fatehpur village, near Mount Abu, Rajasthan, while operating flight
from Gandhinagar, Gujarat to Mandore, Rajasthan at 0945 UTC on 13.05.2011.
There were four persons on board which included Pilot in Command, Co- Pilot,
one Engineer and a BSF Official.
The Crew of the helicopter filed Flight Plan for direct routing from
Gandhinagar to Mandore for an altitude of 1500 ft AGL. The telephonic clearance
was taken from Area Control land line for a VFR flight. The Helicopter departed
from Gandhinagar at 0850 UTC. ATC advised the pilot of the helicopter VT-EQL to
maintain the preferred altitude of 1500 feet AGL on QNH 1005 hpa.
He was further advised to report 30 miles out. Pilot intimated estimates
as FIR 1030 UTC and ETA destination 1155 UTC. Then the estimates were passed
on to FIC at 30 miles. ATCO directed the pilot of the helicopter to change over to
the frequency 123.75 MHz as the pilot did not reply, ATCO requested another
aircraft to intimate VT-EQL to establish contact with Control on 123.75MHz.
Soon after, the pilot was heard calling on 123.75 MHz. After being released by
Approach Control, Pilot reported his position 30 NM from AAE 1500 feet on QNH
1005 HPA. He did not report any abnormality in operations of helicopter. The
helicopter remained in contact with ACC on frequency 123.75 MHz till 0907 UTC
reporting at 30NM on radial 007 AAE. At time 0908 UTC the helicopter called Jet
Airways Aircraft 2065 to relay the position of 30NM on radial 007 AAE to
Ahmedabad ACC. On Route Radar, the helicopter painted till 0911 UTC and then
the target dropped off at a distance of approx 37 NM from AAE.
The Chetak helicopter VT-EQL was on route R007 from South to North and
developed serious defect in Main Rotor System. As reported by the Eye-witness,
a local farmer, sitting outside his hut and having direct view of the helicopter, the
helicopter was producing intermittent hitting sound. After passing over the hut,
it executed a sudden right turn and fell squarely on the ground and burst into
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flames. The adjacent area and the bushes started burning and fire engulfed the
area of the accident site. His statement was corroborated by another farmer
sitting near his hut about 100 metres away from the accident site. The first Eye-
witness immediately intimated the local Police Station on his mobile phone about
the accident. The Police and Fire tender reached the site of the accident within
half an hour and spread foam and water on the burning helicopter. All the
occupants of the helicopter i.e. pilot, co-pilot, AME and the BSF Official, got burnt
inside the helicopter. The accident took place during the day time at 0945 UTC.
5
Fig.1Topographic chart showing the VT-EQL departure site, the accident site,
the destination and the Route cleared for.
GANDHINAGAR
We are reporting 30
miles on R-007, 1500ft
QNH 005
CRASH SITE
MANDORE
6
1.2 Injuries to Persons
INJURIES
CREW
PASSENGERS
OTHERS
FATAL
2
2
NIL
SERIOUS
0
0
NIL
MINOR
0
NIL
NIL
1.3 Damage to Aircraft
Helicopter was completely destroyed due to impact and fire.
1.4 Other Damages
Nil
1.5 Personnel information
1.5.1 Pilot-in-Command
Details of Licence
License type : CHPL-758
Valid up to : 18-04-2012
Date of Issue : 19-04-2007
Date of Endorsement
on type of Aircraft being flown : 19-04-2007
Date of Last Medical : 23/12/2010
Date of Birth : 12-10-1961
Details of last two IR check : IR no-229 Last IR done on 17
th
Dec 2009 on Bell-212
Skill Test : ST done on 5
th
Nov 2010 on Chetak.
ST done on 17
th
Dec 2010 on Chetak
7
Aircraft Ratings
As PIC : Allouette III/Chetak, Bell 212
As Co-pilot : Allouette III/Chetak, Bell 212
Flying Experience:
Total Flying Experience : 2930:00 Hrs
Flying during last 90 days : 19:15 Hrs
Flying during last 30 days : 19:15 Hrs
Experience on type : 1781:00 Hrs
Flying during last 7 days : 04:00 Hrs
During last 24 hours : Nil
He was not previously involved in any accident/serious incident.
1.5.2 Co-Pilot
License Details:
License type : CHPL NO 919
Valid up to : 11-02-2014
Date of Initial Issue : 12-02-2009
Date of Endorsement on
type of Aircraft being flown : 12-02-2009
Date of Birth : 09-05-1977
Date of Last Medical : 18/01/2011
PC checks : 30
th
April 2010,
27
th
Jan 2011
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Aircraft Ratings:
As PIC : 68:40 hrs on Chetak
As Co-pilot : 78.05 hrs on Chetak
Flying Details : Dual – 99:15 hrs
PIC-68:40 hrs
Co-pilot – 78:05 hrs
Total Flying Experience : 246:00 hrs
Experience on type : 246:00 hrs
Flying during Last One year : 59:20 hrs
Flying during 30 days : 22:55 hrs
Flying during last 7 days : 02:30 hrs
During last 24 hours : Nil
He was not previously involved in any accident/serious incident.
1.5.3 Aircraft Maintenance Engineer
Licence type : A&C
Date of Issue : 29.06.1990
Date of Endorsement of
Aircraft type : Alloutte III B, Artouste III B, Cheetah/ Lama
/ Approval/Authorisation
Experience on type : January 1996 to 13
th
May, 2011
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1.6 Helicopter Information
1.6.1 Helicopter Information
Manufacturer
Helicopter Division, Hindustan Aeronautics
Limited, Bangalore
Type
Chetak Helicopter
Constructors S.NO.
AH-303
Year of Manufacturer
1989
Certificate of Airworthiness
No. 1924, Date of Initial issue.28.11.1988
Currently Valid up to 03-04-2012
Category
Normal
Sub Division
Private
Certificate of Registration
No. 2431/2, Issued on 11/10/1990
Owner (with Address)
Director General, Border Security Force, ‘F’
Wing Hall, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi
Minimum Crew Required
One
Maximum Authorised All Up
Weight
2200 Kgs.
Last Major Inspection
100 hrs on 21/03/2011
Last Inspection
25 hrs on 16/04/2011
Air frame Hrs. Since New
4019 :20 hrs. (up to 10/05/2011)
Air frame Hrs. Since last C of A
43 hrs 55 minutes
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Engine
Single
Manufacturer
Turbomecca / HAL Engine Division
Type
Artouste-III B
Serial No.
H-55484
TSO
432 hrs. 40 minutes
Last Inspection Carried Out
25 hrs on 16/04/2011
Last Major Inspection Carried
out
100 hrs/180 days inspection on 21/03/2011
Average Fuel Consumption
182 kgs/hr (as on 09/02/2011)
Average Oil Consumption
45.313 mg /hr (as on 09/02/2011)
1.6.2 Scrutiny of records
The last major inspection 100 hrs/180 days was carried out on 21
st
March, 2011
at 3975.35 A/F hrs. The helicopter had flown 43 hrs 20 minutes after this
inspection till the day of accident.
The Vertical stabilizer was replaced with new one on 6
th
January, 2011, due to
suspected crack in the removed stabilizer.
No significant snag had been recorded on this helicopter since its last C of A
renewal i.e. on 4
th
April, 2011 except a snag about the RPM indicator not
registering at Gandhinagar, Ahmedabad. The RPM indication snag was rectified
by re-soldering connector wires as the same was found to have come out of the
connector. The standard troubleshooting procedure was not followed. The RPM
indicator was found recording the RPM satisfactorily on ground run given at
Gandhinagar prior to take off from BSF helipad.
The Scrutiny of old records revealed that the helicopter was involved in Tail hit /
heavy landing on 30
th
January, 2005. On 29
th
Jan, 2005 crew had reported “severe
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vertical and lateral vibrations”. As a rectification, drag dampers were checked for
play, MGB, transmission platform and main rotor head mounting, spacing cable
along with bolt and the links were also checked. The helicopter after this
inspection reported vibrations at high speed and high collective pitch. Necessary
rectification action was carried out on drag dampers. On 30
th
January, 2005,
during vibrex check severe vibrations were encountered and helicopter made a
emergency landing about half a kilometre from the Mandore helipad. During
inspection, following damages were observed:
Spacing cable Attachment bolt had sheared off on the yellow sleeve
of the main rotor head.
Spacing cable end had become free and impacted the trailing edge
of red main rotor blade at about 12 inches from blade root and
caused damage to trailing edge 10 inches in length and 5 inches in
width.
Following the incident, Main Gear Box (Serial No. CH435), Main
Rotor Shaft (Serial No. AH 184), Free Wheel and Drive Shaft
Assembly (CH211), Clutch Unit (Sr.No. 402) and Hydraulic Drag
Dampers were sent to HAL for heavy landing checks. It is found that
two separate Defect Reports have been raised by the maintenance
agency for the removal of drag dampers.
a) DIR dated 10.05.2005, which states that Hydraulic Drag Damper Sr.
No CH 802, CH1779, CH1780 were replaced as their calendar life
was near to completion.
b) DIR dated 11.05.2005, which states that Hydraulic Drag Dampers
Sr. No CH 924, CH925, CH926 were replaced for onward dispatch to
HAL for inspection after heavy landing made by the helicopter on
30
th
Jan, 2005. The on numbers were CH733, CH734, and CH735.
However these Sr. No(s) are not available in the Inventory of BSF.
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On 23/12/2008 Hydraulic Drag Damper Sr. No CH 924, CH925,
CH926 were replaced due “Timing out of limits”.
As per log cards of hydraulic drag dampers Sr. No CH 802, CH 1779, CH
1780 were installed on 22/12/2008. These were overhauled at HAL on
06/12/2005 and matched. Thereafter, there is no record of
replacement of the drag dampers.
Drag dampers Sr. No CH 802, CH 1779 matched with the drag
dampers recovered from the accident site. However, the Serial No. of
the third drag damper could not be identified as its body had burnt.
1.6.3 General Description
The Chetak helicopter is a three bladed lifting rotor with an anti torque tail rotor
powered by Turbomeca Artouste IIIB Turbo shaft engine developing 550 S.H.P. at
33,500 R.P.M. The fuselage comprises of two distinct assemblies, the body
structure and the tail boom. The Main Rotor has three foldable, metal covered
blades that are articulated on the hub by means of horizontal and vertical pins.
The equal spacing among the Main Rotor Blades is maintained by three spacing
cables and three hydraulic drag dampers. The anti torque tail rotor is mounted
on the starboard side at the end of the tail boom. The engine output shaft, the
speed of which is already stepped down to 5770 R.P.M. by the engine reduction
gear, drives the main rotor at 355 R.P.M. through the Main Gear Box. The Main
Rotor collective and cyclic pitch variation is controlled through a Swash Plate
assembly. The helicopter has conventional cockpit.
The Main Rotor System consists essentially of Hub which carries three
Main Rotor Sleeves. The blade pitch change is controlled by means of rods
connected at one end to the Blade Horns carried by the Blade Sleeves and at the
other end to the Rotating Star/Upper Swash Plate.
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The Flapping hinge is designed to limit the bending loads applied at the blade
roots as a result of the lift forces acting on the blades. The drag hinge is designed
to limit the bending loads applied at the blade roots as a result of Coriolis
acceleration forces. Oscillations are dampened by means of three Hydraulic
Dampers mounted on the vertical drag hinge pin.
Blade Link is a steel forging with two holes at right angles to each other. The
horizontal hole allows vertical movement about the hub through flap hinge pin.
Horizontal movement of the blade spindle is achieved through the drag hinge pin
fitted in the vertical hole.
Main Rotor Head Operation:
A. Centrifugal loads resulting from the rotation of the blades are carried by
the Tension-Torsion strips in the blade sleeve.
B. If, during rotor operation, the horizontal motion of a blade is disturbed,
two distinct components are used to overcome the disturbance.
The cable spacing equalizer system corrects transient disturbance affecting inter
blade spacing to ensure proper 120° angular distribution among the three blades.
The Hydraulic Drag Dampers limit the horizontal oscillations of the blade by
taking up the loads developed about the drag hinge axis and so facilitate the
action of the blade spacing cables.
C. In the event of vertical flapping being set up, it is automatically
aerodynamically damped by the attendant Coriolis forces.
D. Through contact of their restrained ring, the Centrifugal Droop Restrainers
prevent the blades from the drooping low, when the blades are at rest or rotating
at low speed.
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1.6.4 Load and Trim Sheet
There were four persons onboard including the crew. 309.6 kg. (400 lt.) of fuel
was uplifted at Ahmedabad. Total fuel on board was 565 lt. at take-off. Trim was
within limits.
1.7 Met Information
1.7.1 Met Report from Ahmedabad Airport (Just Before Take-off)
Time : 0840 UTC
S/WIND : VRB/2 kts
Visibility : 6 km.
Clouds : NSC
Temp. : 39 deg. C
Dew Point : 16
QNH : 1005 hPa 2968 INS
QFE : 998 hPa 2949 INS
Trend : NOSIG
1.8 Aids to Navigation
N/A
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1.9 Communication
ATC Communication record of Ahmedabad
The start up was approved by Area control (ACC) at 084815 UTC. The PIC
was advised to contact at frequency 119.8 MHz after getting airborne. At 085848
UTC, Area communicated to FIC the airborne time as 0850, FIR estimate was
given as 1030 UTC and ETA Mandore as 1155 UTC. At 085326 UTC the helicopter
VT-EQL established contact with TAR controller at frequency 119.8 Mhz. At
085519 UTC, the helicopter was cleared to climb to 1500 ft and further advised to
report after reaching the altitude. At 085528 UTC the helicopter confirmed
having reached 1500 ft height and transmitted the ETA Jodhpur at 1040 with
1155 QNH. At 090642 UTC, the ASR advised helicopter to report its position at 30
miles north of AAE and establish contact with the Control on 123.75 MHz. At
090740 UTC, the helicopter relayed its position to ACC as 30 NM on R-007 at
1500 ft on QNH 1005 hPa. The helicopter was not responding to the call. ASR
relayed the message through JAI 2065. At 090805 UTC, JAI relayed the message
and confirmed that the helicopter was in contact with the Control on 123.75 MHz
and reporting at 30 NM at radial 007 AAE. PIC did not report any sort of
abnormality / technical malfunction during the operations.
The helicopter remained in contact with ACC on frequency 123.75 Mhz till
0907 UTC. ON Route Radar the helicopter painted till 0911 UTC and then the
target dropped off at a distance of approximately 37 NM from Ahmedabad (AAE).
1.10 Flight Recorders
CVR and FDR were not installed on the helicopter as these are not
required as per the regulations.
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1.11 Wreckage and Impact Information
The accident site is approximately 25 km West of Abu Road. The
coordinates of accident site are 24˚32’33” N, 72˚38’35” E.
The accident site is a hilly barren land with slight slope and embedded with
stones. As per the Eye witness No. 1 helicopter made a right turn before impacting
the ground at approximately 40 meters from the flight path. The helicopter impacted
the accident site in a squarely manner i.e. vertically. There was no forward motion of
the helicopter after the impact. Wreckage of the Helicopter was found confined at
one place approximately in a radius of 20 feet. Due to impact its fuel tank burst and
fuel spread all over the area, resulting in fire which consumed entire cockpit area.
Observations made at the accident site are as given below:
One of the Spacing cable was found attached to its Posts on both sides (Fig.3).
The two other Spacing cables, though anchored to one end of their respective
Cable Posts, had got detached from the link chains attached to the third Cable
Post (Fig.3). The Attachment bolt of one Chain Link had sheared off and the free
end of the detached cable was found near the engine RG casing end. The
Attachment bolt of its second Chain Link though still intact had been pulled out
from its nut end. The link had opened outwards thereby, letting the Spacing
Cable end to come out. This free end of the second Spacing cable had lost its
bush insert and was found lying beneath the Rotor Assembly.
One of the three Hydraulic Drag Dampers had got burnt and the other two were
found badly damaged due to impact.
17
Fig.No 2 View of the Accident Site with the Direction of Approach to the site
One Main rotor blade (MRB) had sheared off due to clean shear, approximately 2 ft
from its root end. The other portion of the Main rotor blade was also lying nearby.
Being on the sloppy ground, it had escaped fire damage to great extent. The other
two MRB’s were partially destroyed in fire and there was no indication that these
blades had rotated (cart wheeled) and grazed after hitting the ground.
All the three Pitch Change Rods were found broken but attached at both the upper
as well as the lower ends. The Pitch Change Tubes were found completely burnt off.
The Freewheel/Drive Shaft and Clutch Unit were found damaged internally by fire.
The Inclined Drive Shaft & universal Joint were found fire damaged
DIRECTION OF
HELICOPTER
COCKPIT PORTION
ROTOR BLADE
AFT PORTION
ROTOR BLADE
18
Fig-3 Main Rotor Hub Assembly with the severed spacing cables
The Tail Boom up to the Horizontal stabilizer stage was found burnt. The Tail drive
shaft was found attached to the tail boom and the TGB but the fire damaged near
the Tail Boom attachment side.
Tail Gear Box, Spider Mechanism and Tail Rotor Hub were found intact but ceased
may be due to heavy impact.
Two Tail Rotor Blades (TRB) were found attached with Tail Rotor Shaft and third
Blade was found to have sheared off near its root end. No TRB had any sign of
grazing the ground due to impact while in rotation.
SEVERED END OF
THE CABLE
SEVERED END OF THE
CABLE
CABLE
POST
19
Fig.4 MGB Transmission showing the damaged pitch change rods
Only a couple of pieces of Tail Rotor Guard were left on the ground.
The Power cable of the Portable Refueling Pump was found lying approximately 100
feet away in the front side of main wreckage thereby indicating that it got detached
from the pump and was thrown out of the cabin when the Perspex of the cabin
shattered due to heavy impact with the ground.
DAMAGED
PITCH
CHANGE
RODS
20
Fig. 5 Tail Portion of the Helicopter showing the Tail rotor Blades
Portable Refueling Rubber Hose & Nozzle was found lying at approximately 60 feet
away in the front side of main wreckage. Two HF Communication boxes were
recovered from about 60 ft on the front side of the wreckage.
Large number Plexi-glass pieces of the wind Screen were found lying scattered on
the front side of the wreckage area.
The entire Cockpit with its Instrument Panel, Control sticks, Seats and the occupants,
Tech Log Book, Aircraft documents, Log Book of the Co-pilot and the Air borne
toolbox were reduced to ashes due to the intense fire.
The Transmission Platform with the Fuel Tank under it and the entire Baggage hold
compartment in the Aft -Section of the fuselage together with the Communication
Equipment and the Alkaline Battery were completely destroyed in the fire.
BENT ROTOR
BLADE
DETACHED
ROTOR BLADE
21
1.11.1 Examination of the Wreckage in the Hangar
The wreckage of the helicopter was relocated to BSF hangar at Safdurjung
airport for the purpose of post accident examination. Following are the
observations:
State of Airframe
(a) Cockpit
Cockpit portion was totally destroyed in fire. OAT (‘S’) & ADE
Receivers (two) were picked up at 50 feet from the main wreckage.
All the instruments were destroyed in fire. Portable fire extinguisher
and portable refueller were also destroyed in fire.
(b) Central Section
Totally destroyed in fire.
(c) Aft Section
Battery (Battery/radio composition) Radio equipment (VFH/UHF)
all destroyed in fire. Fuel Tank – no trace left other than fiber glass
outer covering as bits and pieces had scattered within 50 feet from
the main wreckage.
(d) Tail boom
Forward portion completely destroyed in fire. Tail section
including horizontal stabilizer was intact. Vertical fin was damaged
due to impact. Tail rotor had broken. Tail rotor (TR) guard had
22
broken. Tail Gear box was intact with two TR blades, and was bent
due to impact. One TRB sheered off at the cuff due to impact. No
grazing of TRB tips on ground indicating either they were freely
rotating at a very low rpm or had stopped rotating.
(e) Aero-engine
RG casing fully destroyed in fire. Power Output shaft engaged and
visible. Speed Governor, oil pump partially destroyed in fire.
Compressor housing, air intake destroyed in fire. Combustion
Chamber casing intact. Turbine casing intact. No rubbing marks
inside the casing. Exhaust Jet pipe intact – partially dented due
impact. Dual coil ignition, AC Box and starter generator, Particle
separator were completely destroyed in fire. Torch igniters in
position.
(f) M.R. Transmission
Free wheel & shaft partially destroyed in fire. Clutch Unit
intact but seized.
i) Main Gear Box
Magnesium casting was totally destroyed in fire along with
external monitoring like tachometer, oil pump. Lower bevel
gear intact. No signs of wear /broken teeth or metal
deposition. Crown worm gear intact, no signs of abnormal
wear or breakage of teeth.
ii) Main Rotor Shaft
No damage was observed to the shaft.
23
1.12 Medical and Pathological Information
The post mortem examination of crew and passengers was carried out.
The cause of death has been given to be shock due to whole body injuries and
burns. All injuries were ante mortem in nature.
1.13 Fire
Entire cockpit area was consumed in fire. Examination of the wreckage
indicated the fire to be post impact. Due to impact the fuel tank burst. This
caused spillage of the fuel and fire.
1.14 Survival Aspects
The post mortem examination of crew and passengers indicated the cause
of death to be shock resulting from burns and multiple injuries. The helicopter
impacted the ground in squarely manner from a height. This was followed by the
intense fire which consumed the entire cockpit. The accident was not survivable.
The Eye-witness immediately intimated the police about the accident. The police
and fire tender reached the site of the accident within half an hour, and spread
foam and water on the burning helicopter. All the occupants of the helicopter
(pilot & co-pilot, AME and the BSF official) were charred inside the helicopter.
At time 1209 UTC, a telephone call received at Aerodrome Control Tower from
the office of IG, BSF, Jodhpur that VT-EQL had not reached the destination.
At time 1215 UTC, Area Controller Tower was informed by BSF about a possible
crash of helicopter near Sirohi and that the helicopter could be VT-EQL taken off
from Gandhinagar for Mandore departed at 0855 UTC estimate FIR 1030UTC
and ETA Mandore 1155 UTC (as per FPS).
24
WSO, Ahmedabad, immediately initiated search and rescue alerting actions and
informed all concerned including RCC Mumbai and Delhi due to the proximity of
the probable crash site being in the border of Delhi/Mumbai FIR.
At time 1357 UTC SP, Sirohi, Rajasthan was contacted by Jt GM (ATM) who
confirmed that helicopter VT-EQL had crashed in Bhimhguda in Fatehpura village
in Bahadurpura Gram Panchayat in Girwar Police Chowki, 25 Km from Abu Road
and BSF rescue team had also reached the site.
The crash site was at 25 Km west of Abu Road at radial 275/72 NM from UUD
VOR and radial 360/98 NM from AAE VOR which was approx 61 NM further
from the last point of two way communication with ACC Ahmedabad.
1.15 Tests and Research
1.15.1 Tear down inspection of Main Gear Box
Tear down inspection was carried out at BSF hangar under the
supervision of Committee of Inquiry.
History and related Data
Part No. : 319A.62.00.000.3
Serial No. : CH-435
TSO : 512:55 hrs.
External Observations
No damage was observed on the upper portion of Main Gear Box (MGB),
Main Rotor Shaft and Main Rotor Head Assembly. The lower portion (Magnesium
casting) of MGB was completely burnt /melted away exposing the Crown and
worm gear.
25
Fig. 6 View of Transmission
Examination on Disassembly
The MR Head & Shaft were removed from the Assembly. The top case was
removed, which exposed the carrier and ring gear. All the male splines on the root end
of the MRS and female splines on the mating gear head were found undamaged.
The Ring gear together with Planetary gears were found undamaged and freely
rotating even after the huge impact and the violent fire. All the eight gears were intact
(Fig. 7). They were freely rotating with no sign of seizure or breakage of teeth. Central
gear was intact. No signs of abnormal wear or breakage of teeth were observed.
The Crown & Worm gear teeth also did not exhibit any damage, galling or pitting.
LOWER CONE
HINGE
SLEEVE
26
Conclusion:
The transmission gears were in good condition. No breakage, pitting, galling was
observed. The gears in the transmission were capable of smooth transmission of
power.
Fig. 7 Ring Gear
27
Fig. 8 Main Rotor Drive Shaft
Fig. 9 Planetary Gears
SPLINES
28
1.15.2 Main Rotor Head
MRH Sr. No. AH 116
Spacing Cable Sr. No’s
a) 30172
b) 30324
c) 30203.
One Attachment Bolt was found to have sheared off, and the link bent
outwards, thereby letting the Cable to get disengaged from the post. The second
Attachment Bolt was found to have come out of the Link after bending the Link outward
through 90 degrees and disengaging the cable end from the post. Deep scoring marks
were found on the swaged end of the cable Sr. No. 30172. The inner bushes of eye-ends
of the cables Sr. No. 30172 & 30324 were missing.
1.15.3 Hydraulic Drag Damper Assemblies (Sl No(s). CH-802, CH-1779 & CH-1780)
Damper Sl No. Ch 802 & 1780 were found mounted on the Drag Hinge
Pins of MRH. The sight gauges were found to have broken and pistons of two dampers
had ceased. The body of the third Damper was found to have burnt off. Therefore, the
serial no. of the third damper could not be ascertained.
Fig. 10 Hydraulic Drag Dampers
SL No. CH 802
SL No. CH
1780
29
1.15.4 Inspection of Engine
The Artouste IIIB Aero Engine Sr No.H-55484 was found intact. It exhibited impact
and fire damage.
Fig. 11 Right Side view of the engine
The Magnesium Reduction Gear Casing of the Engine had got
completely burnt /melted, with all the gear train in position. The Fuel
Pump, Governor Assemblies etc had partially got melted.
The Compressors & its housing, Combustion Chamber, the Turbine discs
were found to be intact.(Fig. 11)
None of the blades of Ist stage centrifugal compressor exhibited
breakage, impact or foreign object damage. (Fig. 12)
There was no evidence of the Turbine blades having grazed the turbine
casing. ( Fig. 13 )
The exhaust section of the engine was found unburnt and attached to the
Engine Turbine casing.
30
Fig. 12 Inlet to Ist Stage Compressor
Fig. 13 Last Stage Turbine Blades
31
Conclusion:
There was no failure of the engine or the bearings.
1.15.5 Metallurgical Examination.
1.15.5.1 The Spacing Cables, Mounting Posts (Spindle) and Attachment Bolts
& Links had been removed by the Inspector of Accidents appointed
by the DGCA for Material Failure Analysis at DGCA R&D Laboratory.
These parts were recovered from the Lab together with the Initial
Report and sent to NAL for material Failure Analysis for second
opinion.
1.15.5.2 Three fractured pitch change rods and the components belonging
to the Spacing Cable Assembly of Chetak helicopter VT-EQL were
forwarded to NAL laboratory for establishing the mode of failure.
NAL carried out the fractographic examination and they have given
following conclusions:
Fractographic analysis confirmed that the pitch change rods and the
Bolts/bushes of the attachment links with the trunnion as well as the cables had
broken by overload fracture. The failure of the bushes of the bolt of the
attachment link with the trunnion indicates that the bolt had experienced very
high load. This in turn indicates that there was excessive load on the attachment
link. This is further substantiated by the deformation marks on the shank of the
fractured bolt and also, bending of one of the fork arms of both the attachment
links. The deformation pattern on the fork of the links suggests that excessive
tension in the spacing cables was responsible for the fracturing of the bolt. In the
sequence of failure, fracture had occurred first at the bolt-head end. Following
this fracture, the whole load on the spacing cable was supported by one of the
arms of the links, leading to bending in a direction out of the loading plane. The
32
bending of one of the fork arms along with the fractured part of the bolt would
also allow the cable anchoring end to come out of the attachment link.
Examination of pitch change rods revealed bending of the pitch change
rods preceded the fracture. This indicates that rods were acted upon by bending
load during the fracture. There were no evidences of progressive failure such as
fatigue or stress corrosion or cracking in any of the pitch change rods.
1.15.5.3 Visual and macro examination of failed Spacing Cable bolt was carried out at
Metallurgical examination laboratory of the DGCA. The report concludes as
follows:
“Presence of the equiaxed dimples and shear dimples on the fractured surface of
the shank portion of the threaded end and head end of the failed bolt
respectively indicated that bolt had failed under overload condition.”
1.15.6 Examination of fuel samples
A sample of fuel of the same barrel as was used on the helicopter was
obtained and subjected to examination at Indian oil Laboratory at Ahmedabad.
As per the examination report received there was no abnormality in the sample.
1.16 Organisation and Management Information
1.16.1 Border Security Force (BSF)
BSF Air Wing was established in the year 1969. Presently, BSF Air Wing is
maintaining and operating 01 Embraer, 02 Avro, 01 SKA B200 Aircraft, 08 Dhruv
(out of which 07 have been delivered to BSF by HAL manufacturer) and 01
Cheetah Helicopter at different location under civil registration as per DGCA.
Whereas, 06 MI IV Helicopter are under military registration.
33
BSF Air Wing was approved under CAR 145/ CAR-M on 11
th
July, 2011
for maintenance and operation of aircraft in airworthy standard. The line
maintenance on Embraer, Avro & SKA B200 aircraft is carried out by BSF.
Whereas, Major Maintenance work is carried out by CAR-145 AMOs. The
maintenance of Dhruv, Chetak/Cheetah helicopter is carried out by HAL/PHHL on
contract basis.
Operational Control
BSF has operations and maintenance contract with M/s Pawan Hans
Helicopters Ltd w.e.f. 29
th
Sept., 2010. After studying the O&M contract between
the two parties, the relevant clauses of the contract can be stated as:
To maintain records in respect of consumption of stock, spares, POL
authorization books and other such documents as prescribed by
Government (DGCA/AAI) and will send monthly statement/return
to BSF air wing and concerned BSF Headquarters.
Operation and maintenance agency will provide consultancy
services on aviation matter, which are incidental for maintenance
and operation of helicopters.
To maintain complete flying records, manifest returns and any
other returns required from time to time for flying and
maintenance of the helicopters as per the requirements of
DGCA/AAI/IAF/ Government and maintenance manuals.
However it was found that neither of the parties was exercising any
operational control and due to which no crew related records/ documents
were maintained by any of the party. Although both the organisations
have elaborate operations setup, the BSF assigns operational task to PHHL
for making the aircraft and the crew available. However neither of the
34
parties was monitoring the FDTL of the crew, currency of their rating and
qualification before operation of the flight.
Maintenance control
1.16.2 Summit Aviation Limited
For the period from 1989 to 2010, the maintenance of the helicopter was
with M/s Summit Aviation. A review of the maintenance record indicates the
following discrepancies:
The log cards were not maintained properly. In a few instances the
original log cards were missing.
A few log cards were raised without the authentication by
concerned AME or without the certificate/label from the
OEM/Overhaul agency (HAL).
The airframe hours at which the component has been fitted on the
aircraft have not been entered.
After the tail rotor strike incident on 30.01.2005, a set of the drag
dampers earlier installed were not found in the inventory of the BSF
or issued to them by the BSF.
1.16.3 Pawan Hans Helicopter Limited (PHHL)
PHHL signed a contract with BSF for O&M of Cheetah and Chetak
Helicopter on 29th Sept 2010. The scope of the contract included "to arrange
suitable/qualified pilots, engineers and technicians for undertaking operation
and maintenance activities including quality control of Cheetah and Chetak
Helicopters within the framework of DGCA rules at Srinagar and Jodhpur".
The routine contract was for maintenance up to 400hrs/2 yearly inspection
for which PHHL was approved vide DGCA Letter ref PHHL/F-APP/2876 dated
35
29.12.2010 under A3 Rating for Jodhpur Sub Base after due inspection of the
base. The following discrepancies were observed:
Aircraft log books for the year 2005 to 2010 were not available.
It appears that M/s PHHL did not exercise any quality control over
the maintenance activities of their AME.
They did not possess copies of the maintenance manual and other
technical literature for preparing and updating the aircraft
maintenance program on the basis of which call outs are required to
be issued.
There was frequent rotation (weekly/fortnightly) of the technicians at the
outstation maintenance Bases. The rotation of the personnel was carried
out without any consideration for the relevant skill, level of experience
and to ensure the continuity in the maintenance activity.
M/s PHHL while taking over the O& M contract did not exercise due
diligence. There was no handing over and taking over or inspection of the
records, facilities and spares.
Inventory of rotables/special equipments and consumables was under the
charge of BSF but were being utilized by PHHL. The inventory control was
found to be deficient in terms of:
a) Curing dates and the shelf life of the hoses were not mentioned.
b) The list of components was not complete and updated.
c) There was no tracking of the components sent to HAL for the
purpose of maintenance/investigation of the components for e.g.
drag damper serial no. CH-524, CH-525, CH-526 removed on
23/12/2008 were sent to M/s HAL for maintenance. The same have
not yet been received back as per the inventory.
d) Calibration record of special tools and testers were not made
available to the committee for the verification purposes. Apparently
the calibration records are not being maintained.
36
1.16.4 Surveillance of maintenance activities by BSF
VT-EQL was based at Jodhpur. BSF has never carried out the surveillance/
audit inspection of the Jodhpur base and the maintenance activities by the AMO
on their helicopter. They have a Quality Manager; however as per the
organisation his scope of work was limited to the fixed wing aircraft. The
oversight of the maintenance activity of helicopter was left to the service
provider.
After signing of O& M contract with M/S PHHL, BSF did not exercise due diligence
in handing over of documents and equipments to the AMO formally.
1.17 Additional Information
1.17.1 Chetek Helicopter accidents that occurred in the Indian Air force in the
year 1978 and 1979 respectively.
Sno
Date
Brief description
1.
3
rd
November,
1978
This accident was probably due to failure of
hydraulic Drag Damper in Flight thus imposing
excessive load on the blade spacing system
resulting in the breakage of links.
2.
01
st
May, 1979
This accident was probably due to failure of
hydraulic Drag Damper in Flight thus imposing
excessive load on the blade spacing system
resulting in the breakage of links and the broken
spacing cable cut through the two pitch control
rods leading of loss of control of Helicopters.
37
1.17.2 Issue regarding diversion from the flight path while flying on direct routing
on Gandhinagar-Jodhpur sector was discussed with the pilots who have earlier
been flying the same helicopter on the same sector. They have suggested as
follows:
On a direct route from Gandhinagar to Jodhpur, especially in the afternoon hours
during summer months, the visibility in the Arravalli Hills (Mount Abu area)
reduces to between 1000 to 2000 meters. In addition, this area does not have
enough open fields, where a helicopter can be landed safely, in case of any
emergency. Whereas, the area slightly west of the route, has much better
visibility and far lower hills with sufficient number of fields, suitable for putting
the helicopter down, in case an emergency action may so require.
Considering the above factors, it is most prudent, in the interest of safety, to stay
slightly west of track in this area, especially during the summer season during the
afternoon period.
2. Analysis
2.1 Maintenance Aspects
2.1.1 Airworthiness of the Helicopter
The Certificate of Airworthiness of the helicopter was current and valid.
Periodicity of all scheduled maintenance task were maintained. As per the
available records no significant snag has been recorded on this helicopter
since its last C of A renewal on 4
th
April, 2011 except a snag about the RPM
indicator at Gandhinagar. The R.P.M. indication snag was rectified by re-
soldering cable wire as the same has come out of the connector. The RPM
indicator was found recording the RPM satisfactorily on ground run given
at Gandhinagar prior to take off from BSF Helipad. The aircraft was under
the maintenance of CAR-145 approved maintenance organisation. Aircraft
Maintenance Engineer who carried out Daily inspection on the day of
38
accident held A&C Licence and held full scope approval for maintenance of
this type of helicopter. During Gandhinagar-Mandore flight of the day no
snag was reported before the accident took place.
Examination of the wreckage site had revealed that helicopter approached
the accident site after making a right turn and had impacted the ground in
squarely manner i.e. vertically. The force of impact is indicated by the
shattering of front plexi glass at impact. The main wreckage was
approximately 40 meters from the flight path being flown by the
helicopter.
Therefore to detect any malfunction of the Main Gear Box (MGB) its
disassembly was carried out. During inspection it was observed that
Planetary gear system was undamaged and freely rotating. All the eight
gears were intact. They were freely rotating with no sign of seizure or
breakage of teeth. Central gear was intact. No signs of abnormal wear of
breakage of teeth was observed. The Crown, Worm gear teeth also did not
exhibit any damage, galling or pitting. The gears in the transmission were
capable of smooth transmission of power.
To detect any failure of the engine, a detailed inspection of the engine
was carried out. The inspection of the engine revealed the following:
The Magnesium Reduction Gear Casing of the Engine had completely
melted with all the gear train in position. The Fuel Pump, Governor
Unit etc had partially got melted.
None of the blades of Ist stage centrifugal compressor exhibited
breakage, impact or foreign object damage.
There was no evidence of the Turbine blades having grazed the turbine
casing.
It indicates that there was not any failure of the engine or the bearings.
39
The damage to the helicopter structure and its systems was due to
impact and fire.
As per CAR Section 2 Series F Part V, the Certificate of Airworthiness of an
aircraft shall be deemed to be suspended when an aircraft ceases or fails
to conform with condition stipulated in the Type Certificate or C of A,
airworthiness requirements in respect of operation, maintenance,
modification, repair, replacement, overhaul, process or inspection
applicable to that aircraft, or is modified or repaired otherwise than in
accordance with approved procedure, or suffers major/substantial damage
(which requires replacement or extensive repair of any major component),
or develop a major defect which would affect the safety of the aircraft or
its occupants in subsequent flights.
The Helicopter was maintained as per the approved maintenance
programme. The snag reported before the accidental flight was rectified
at Gandhinagar prior to take-off for Mandore. Thus it can be safely
concluded that the aircraft was in airworthy condition to undertake the
flight.
2.1.2 Failure of Spacing cable and attachment bolts
Examination of wreckage at the accident site revealed that one of the spacing
cables was attached to its Posts on both sides. The two other spacing cables,
though anchored to one end of their respective Cable Posts, had got detached
from the link chains attached to the third Cable Post. The Attachment bolt of one
Chain Link had sheared off and the free end of the detached cable was found
near the engine RG casing end. The attachment bolt of its second Chain Link
though still intact had been pulled out from its nut end. Both the links had
opened outwards thereby, letting the Spacing Cable ends to come out. This free
40
end of the second Spacing cable had lost its bush insert and was found lying
beneath the Rotor Assembly. Further all the three Pitch Change Rods were found
broken but attached at both the upper as well as the lower ends. Attachment end
of one of the swaged end of the severed spacing cable Sl. No. 30172 indicated
deep scoring marks.
For establishing the mode of failure the pitch change rods and the
components belonging to the spacing cable post assembly were examined at NAL
laboratory. NAL carried out the fractographic examination and they have given
following conclusions:
“Bolts/bushes of the attachment links with the trunnion as well as the cables
had broken by overload fracture. The failure of the bushes of the bolt of the
attachment link with the trunnion indicates that the bolt had experienced very
high load. This in turn indicates that there was excessive load on the attachment
link. This is further substantiated by the deformation marks on the shank of the
fractured bolt and also, bending of one of the fork arms of both the attachment
links. The deformation pattern on the fork of the links suggests that excessive
tension in the spacing cables was responsible for the fracturing of the bolt. In the
sequence of failure, fracture had occurred first at the bolt-head end. Following
this fracture, the whole load on the spacing cable was supported by one of the
arms of the links, leading to bending in a direction out of the loading plane. The
bending of one fork arm of both the attached links along with the fractured part
of the bolt had allowed the cable anchoring end to come out of the attachment
link.
Examination of pitch change rods revealed bending of the pitch change
rods preceded the fracture. This indicates that rods were acted upon by
bending load during the fracture. There were no evidences of progressive
failure such as fatigue or stress corrosion or cracking in any of the pitch change
rods.”
41
The above result of the metallurgical examination lends credence to the fact that
there was excessive tension in the Spacing Cables which led to the failure of the
Attachment Bolts. As one of the cables was released from the post, it became
free and started hunting thus caused failure of the pitch change rods. Failure of
the Pitch Change Rods was probably due to the hit by the Spacing Cable end.
The cable spacing equalizer system corrects transient disturbance affecting
inter blade spacing to ensure proper 120° angular distribution of the three
blades. Therefore release of one of the spacing cable resulted in imbalance in the
rotor system and led to the release of the other spacing cable from the same
post. The other spacing cable does not indicate much hit marks indicating that it
was released shortly before the impact of the helicopter with the ground.
Centrifugal loads resulting from the rotation of the blades are carried by the
tension-torsion strips in the blade sleeve. If, during rotor operation, the
horizontal motion of a blade is disturbed, two distinct components are used to
overcome the disturbance.
The cable spacing equalizer system corrects transient disturbance affecting
inter blade spacing to ensure proper 120° angular distribution of the three
blades.
The drag hinge dampers limit the horizontal oscillations of the blade by
taking up the loads developed about the drag hinge axis and so facilitate
the action of the blade spacing cables.
The metallurgical examination has indicated excessive tension in the spacing
cable. This excessive tension in the spacing cable may be due to the malfunction
of the hydraulic drag damper. The set of drag dampers recovered from the
accident site were installed on this helicopter on 22/12/2008. These were
installed after the previous set was found to have “Timing out of limits”. The set
had been overhauled at HAL on 06/12/2005 and matched. Two of the Drag
dampers recovered from the site were identified while the third drag damper due
to damage could not be identified as its body had got burnt. However due to the
damage, the three drag dampers could not be subjected to bench check.
42
Inspection of the BSF store inventory indicated that they do not have equipment
for the drag damper timing check. Neither there was any record of their
procuring such equipment. This indicates that their assessment of drag damper
timing was based on estimation and not actual measurements. Therefore snag
may not have been detected at its initiations.
The Hydraulic Drag Damper malfunction in flight would cause severe
vibrations that could not be dampened. The imbalance or hunting movements of
the advancing / retreating Blades would cause transmission of excessive tensile
loads from the Rotor Blade System to the Spacing Cable Posts. This would result
in excessive tensile load which might cause failure of Attachment Bolts /Links.
Review of the similar accidents to the Chetak Helicopters operated by
Indian Air force in the year 1978 and 1979 respectively indicated that these
accidents had occurred probably due to failure of Hydraulic Drag Dampers in
Flight thus imposing excessive load on the blade spacing system resulting in the
breakage of links and the broken spacing cable cut through the two pitch control
rods leading of loss of control of Helicopter.
Thus Malfunction of Drag Dampers caused excessive vibrations, transmitting
tensile load on the spacing Cable system and resulting in breakage of Link
attachment bolt. The spacing cable eye-end got released; whip lashed the pitch
control rods and broke them in quick succession.
2.1.3 Management of maintenance records
Scrutiny of records revealed that the helicopter was involved an incident
on 30
th
January, 2005. Following the incident among other parts of rotor
hydraulic drag damper assembly were sent to HAL for inspection on heavy
landing checks. For the removal of drag damper two Defect reports were raised.
43
1) Dated 10.05.2005, which states that Hydraulic Drag Damper Sr. No CH 802,
CH1779, CH1780 were replaced due as their calendar life was near to
completion.
2) Dated 11.05.2005, which states that Hydraulic Drag Damper Sr. No CH 924,
CH925, CH926 were replaced due incident for inspection purposes. The on
numbers were CH733, CH734, and CH735. However these Sr. No(s) are not
available in the Inventory of BSF.
Neither of Summit Aviation, nor PHHL nor the BSF could provide the Defect
Investigation report of the removed drag dampers.
Neither BSF nor PHHL could provide aircraft logbooks of the helicopter
from the year 2005 to 2010.
Log cards of the components have been locally raised and entries have not
been signed by any authorized person.
Thus from above it appears that for all the years the helicopter was operating
without any review of the maintenance activities of the certifying personnel by
the AMO. No system existed for the upkeep of the maintenance literature,
documents, log books and the stock in the bonded store. In other words
Maintenance Quality Control was non-existent.
2.2 Operation Aspect
2.2.1 Crew Qualification
Both the crew held valid license and were qualified on type. The PIC had a total
flying experience of 2930:00 Hrs out of which 1781:00 Hrs were on Allouette
III/Chetak type of helicopter. The co pilot had total flying Experience of 246 hrs.
all of which was on the type of the helicopter being flown.
44
CAR Section 7 Series B Part XIV requires as under
a) Proficiency Checks. All pilots engaged in commercial operations carrying
passengers shall undergo proficiency checks covering aspects as applicable for
type of helicopter and operator’s role. The proficiency check will be carried out by
DGCA approved examiner twice in a year with not less than four months and not
more than eight months between any two checks.
b) Route/Line/LOFT Check. These checks will be carried out once a year to cover
exercises as applicable to the type of helicopter(s).
For the Co pilot the Proficiency check was carried out on 30
th
April 2010 and then
on 27 January 2011, the next became due on 30
th
April 2011. However the same
has not been carried out. Also the check carried out on 27
th
January 2011 should
have been carried out by 30
th
of December 2010.
Thus there is discrepancy in the currency of the licence of the Co Pilot.
2.2.2 Conduct of the flight
The Crew of the helicopter filed Flight Plan for direct routing from
Gandhinagar to Mandore for an altitude of 1500 ft AGL. The telephonic clearance
was taken from Area Control land line for a VFR flight. The Helicopter departed
from Gandhinagar at 0850 UTC. ATC advised the pilot of the helicopter VT-EQL to
maintain the preferred altitude of 1500 feet AGL on QNH 1005 hpa. He was
further advised to report 30 miles out. Pilot intimated estimates as FIR 1030 UTC
and ETA destination 1155 UTC. Then the estimates were passed on to FIC at 30
miles. The helicopter remained in contact with ACC on frequency 123.75 MHz till
0907 UTC reporting at 30NM on radial 007 AAE. At time 0908 UTC the helicopter
called JAI 2065 to rely the position of 30NM on radial 007 AAE to Ahmedabad
ACC. On route radar, the helicopter painted till 0911 UTC and then the target
dropped at distance of approx. 37 NM from AAE. The accident site was towards
45
the west of the track by almost 12 miles. Apparently the helicopter was following
west of the route. The highest hill in the region on the route was the Mt Abu at
5650 ft. To ascertain the reasons for the deviation, views of the pilots who had
earlier flown the helicopter of type in this region/route was obtained. As per their
opinion
“On a direct route from Gandhinagar to Jodhpur, especially in the afternoon hours
during summer months, the visibility in the Arravali Hills (Mount Abu area)
reduces between 1000 to 2000 meters. In addition, this area does not have
enough open fields, where a helicopter can be landed safely, in case of any
emergency. Whereas, the area slightly west of the route, has much better
visibility and far lower hills with sufficient number of fields, suitable for putting
the helicopter down, in case an emergency action may so require.
Considering the above factors, it is most prudent, in the interest of safety, to stay
slightly west of track in this area, especially during the summer season during the
afternoon period.”
Thus deviation of the helicopter to the West of the route was carried out in the
interest of safety as this region has much better visibility and far lower hills
with sufficient number of fields, suitable for putting the helicopter down in case
an emergency action may so require.
2.2.3 Handling of Emergency
While the aircraft was flying in the Arravalli hill range, to the West of the cleared
route, it experienced the failure of the spacing cable. The released spacing cable
impacted the pitch change rods successively. Due to the load asymmetry in the
rotor system the other spacing cable was also released from its attachment point.
The blade pitch change is controlled by means of rods connected at one end to
the blade horns carried by the blade sleeves and at the other end to the rotating
star or upper swash plate.
46
As the pitch change rods gave way, the pilot lost collective and cyclic control.
Pilot could not put the helicopter in autorotation and flare it for cushioning its
landing. The helicopter virtually stood still in air before falling squarely on the
ground with no tilt towards any side. Before approaching the accident site the
helicopter made a right turn and impacted the ground with high impact force at
approximately 40 metres from the route being flown. This indicates that the
impact with the ground was after falling from a substantial height which resulted
in the burst of fuel tank and helicopter caught fire.
Though the engines were producing power, and transmitting to the rotor
assembly, the crew could not cushion the landing due to loss of control.
3. CONCLUSION
3.1 Findings
3.1.1 The Helicopter was maintained as per the approved maintenance programme.
No snag related to Engine or Tail Transmission system was reported before the
accidental flight. The MGB, TGB, Engine and associated drives were checked after
the crash and no abnormality was observed. Thus the helicopter apparantly was
in airworthy condition to undertake the flight.
3.1.2 The deformation pattern on the fork ends of two links suggests excessive tension
in the Spacing Cables.
3.1.3 Bolts/bushes of the attachment links with the trunnion as well as the cables had
broken by overload fracture caused due to excessive tension in the spacing
cables.
3.1.4 Pitch change rods were acted upon by bending load during the fracture imposed
probably by hitting of the released spacing cable. There were no evidences of
47
progressive failure such as fatigue or stress corrosion or cracking in any of the
pitch change rods.
3.1.5 Probable malfunction of Drag Dampers resulted in excessive vibrations,
transmitting tensile load on the spacing Cable system and resulting in breakage of
Link attachment bolt. The spacing cable end got released; probably whip lashed
hard the pitch control rods and broke them in quick succession. Pilot lost the
Cyclic & Collective control of the Helicopter which resulted in crash landing
without any auto-rotative cushioning available to it.
3.1.6 The helicopter was operating without review of the maintenance activities of the
Certifying personnel by the Quality control of the AMOs. There was no review of
the maintenance literature, documents, log books and the stock in the bonded
store. In other words Maintenance Quality Control was nonexistent.
3.1.7 Both the Pilots had valid endorsement on the type of the helicopter.
3.1.8 There was a discrepancy in the currency of the licence of the Co pilot. The
Proficiency check was carried out on 30
th
April 2010 and then on 27
th
January
2011, the next became due on 30
th
April 2011. However the same has not been
carried out. Also the check carried out on 27
th
January 2011 should have been
carried out by 30
th
of December 2010.
3.1.9 Helicopter deviated to the West of the route while flying in the Arravalli range.
The deviation was carried out in the interest of safety as this region has much
better visibility and far lower hills with sufficient number of fields, suitable for
putting the helicopter down, in case an emergency action may so require.
3.1.10 Before approaching the accident site the helicopter made a right turn and
impacted the ground with high impact force at approximately 40 metres from
the route being flown. Helicopter impacted the ground in the squarely manner
i.e. vertically and with no forward movement.
48
3.1.11 As the pitch change rods broke, the collective and cyclic control was lost. Though
the engines was producing power and transmitting to the Rotor Assembly, the
crew could not cushion the landing due to loss of control.
3.1.12 Neither the BSF nor M/s PHHL were monitoring the FDTL of the crew, currency of
their rating and qualification before operation of the flight. This is how despite
the lapse of proficiency check Co Pilot was allowed to operate this flight. Thus
neither BSF nor M/s PHHL was exercising any operational control.
3.1.13 Following incident on 11.05.2005 a Defect Investigation Report was raised,
which stated that Hydraulic Drag Dampers Sr. No CH 924, CH925, CH926 were
replaced and sent to HAL for inspection. The “ON” numbers were CH733, CH734,
and CH735. However these “ON” Sr. No(s) are not available in the Inventory of
BSF.
49
3.2 Cause of Accident
The accident occurred due to loss of control resulting from probable
failure of Hydraulic Drag Dampers in flight which imposed excessive loads on the
Blade Spacing System resulting in the failure of bolts/links. The severed spacing
cable impacted and broke the pitch control rods, leading to loss of control of
Helicopter.
Lack of oversight of Maintenance Activities of the AMOs was the
contributory factor.
4. RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 HAL may review the line maintenance practices of the Hydraulic Drag Dampers in
view of a number of malfunctions of the Drag Dampers in the past.
4.2 In majority of fatal accidents involving the private/NSOPs operator unlike the
scheduled operators, the flying and training records of the crew are not
completely available. DGCA may consider issuing necessary instructions to the
industry to ensure that organisations maintain these records independent of the
individual flight crew.
4.3 Action as deemed fit may be taken against concerned AMOs and the operator for
the lack of supervision of the operational and maintenance activities in view of
findings 3.1.6, 3.1.8 & 3.1.12, 3.1.13.
(S.S. Nat) (Captain P.K. Chabri)
MEMBER MEMBER
(Group Captain M.K. Labroo (Retd.))
CHAIRMAN
